



北京链安
Chains Guard Technology

CBK Smart Contract Audit Report

Beijing Chains Guard Technology

□ Documentation

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□ Scope of application

This security assessment is authorized by the project party. Beijing ChainsGuard Network Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "ChainsGuard") conducts an in-depth security risk assessment of the CBK smart contract; the technical report submitted according to the assessment result is used for The security status of the smart contract makes security assessment and reinforcement recommendations. only limited to ChainsGuard and the internal personnel of the project party.

□ Version change record

Date	Version	Description	Modify by
2020-09-04	V1.1	Document creation	ChainsGuard Security Center

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Disclaimer

The audit report is a technical security audit for the authorized party. The purpose of this audit is to provide the authorized party with a reference basis for conducting its business security assessment and optimization, The regulatory regime of the business model, or any other statement about the applicability of the application, as well as a statement or warranty that the application is in error-free behavior. This report cannot be used as a proof of that these tested systems and codes are absolutely secure and there are no other security risks.

The audit report only covers the code, installation packages and other materials provided by the authorized party, and its conclusion is only applicable to the corresponding version of the application. Once the relevant code, configuration, and operating environment change, the corresponding conclusion will no longer be applicable.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document includes the results of the audit performed by the Chains Guard Team on the CBK project, at the request of the CBK team. The goal of this audit is to review the smart contract code solidity implementation, study potential security vulnerabilities, its general design and architecture, and uncover bugs that could compromise the software in production.

1.2 Audit Time

Evaluation test time	
Start time	2020-09-03
End time	2020-09-04

1.3 Audit Unit

Company Name	The Beijing ChainsGuard Network Technology Co., Ltd.
Web Site	https://www.chainsguard.com/

1.4 Audit Object

Contract Name	File SHA256
CBK	a9e8bd463776b210b29b78eba1354caddf0748acf8b1f4b861ad3 aa58fd34426

2 Security Audit Summary

2.1 Vulnerability Statistics

Vulnerabilities	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk
0	0	0	1

[Note] A brief description of the hazard classification method is as follows

High: It directly causes the system to be controlled or the data to be destroyed. Once it occurs, it is a serious security event.

Medium: It may lead to the leakage of important information or may cause the system to be controlled.

Low: Non-critical information leaks or minor security issues generally do not lead to serious security incidents.

2.2 Audit items

For the ERC20 token contract, we focus on the audit of the following inspection items:

Attack surface	Check list	status	description
----------------	------------	--------	-------------

Reentrancy Attack	Cross-contract interaction	Pass	Unprotected sensitive functions call external contracts
	ETH Transfer	Pass	Unrestricted Gas transfer ETH has a hidden danger of reentry
Unauthorized access	Constructor does not match	Pass	Whether the contract name and constructor in the lower version do not match
	Privileged function exposure	Pass	Exposure of privileged functions caused by incorrect authentication methods
	tx.origin variable abuse	Pass	Whether the contract uses tx.origin for identity authentication
	Access control flaws	Pass	Unreasonable settings for the visibility of functions and state variables
Numerical overflow	Overflow & underflow	Pass	Does the contract have common overflow or underflow vulnerabilities
Race condition	Transaction order dependence	Low risk	Does the final state of the contract depend on the order of transactions
Denial of service	Unexpected transaction rollback	Pass	Is the contract vulnerable to revert cause denial of service
	Gas Price exceeded	Pass	Excessive Gas Price caused by excessive loop
call injection	call function abuse	Pass	The contract receives external input as a parameter of the call function
Fake recharge	Recharge result check	Pass	Whether the contract uses an incorrect method to check the recharge result
Miner privileges	Timestamp dependence	Pass	Does the contract rely on the timestamp to complete the main function
	fake-random number dependence	Pass	Does the contract rely on pseudo-random numbers to complete its main functions
Other checks	External input check	Pass	Whether the contract verifies the legality of external input
	Use untrusted libraries	Information	Whether the contract uses untrusted (unsafe) libraries
	Leakage of sensitive information	Pass	Does the contract have hidden dangers of leaking sensitive information

	Blackhole	Pass	Whether the contract locks ETH or tokens indefinitely
	Contract backdoor	Pass	Does the contract have a backdoor that can be controlled by the project party

3 Checklist

For smart contract source code audit, we focus on the detection of the following security points:

3.1 Reentrancy Attack

One of the main dangers of invoking external contracts is that they can take over the control process. In a reentrancy attack (also called a recursive call attack), a malicious contract will call back the calling contract before the first call to the function is completed. This may cause different calls of the function to interact in an undesirable way.

Test result: **Pass**

3.2 Permission Control

Check whether the functions in the contract use public, private and other keywords correctly for visibility modification. Check whether the contract is correctly defined and use the modifier to restrict access to key functions to avoid unauthorized access.

Test result: **Pass**

3.3 Overflow & Underflow

The numerical processing in the smart contract needs to strictly check the arithmetic overflow/underflow problem, the conventional addition and subtraction arithmetic processing is easy to cause integer overflow or underflow, especially when processing the account amount of similar tokens, it is necessary to strictly judge the size of the account amount. Normally numerical calculation is recommended to use Zeppelin open source module SafeMath for processing.

Test result: **pass**

3.4 Call Injection

When using a low-level interface `call()` for contract interaction in a smart contract, the interface is improperly used. An attacker can control the parameters, method selectors, or execution byte contents of the call interface to perform dangerous operations such as unauthorized transfer, mint, and token burn.

Test result: **pass**

3.5 Race Conditions

Every transaction and smart contract calls requires miner to mine to confirm. Sharing a state between different functions may cause different processing results due to changes in the execution order.

Test result: **Low risk**

Vulnerability details: The location of the vulnerability is in the HxERC20# approve() function. The approval function can be called multiple times. Ethereum In order to encourage miners to mine, miners can decide which transactions to pack. In order to maximize benefits, miners usually choose to pack larger Gas Price transactions instead of relying on the order of transactions. Therefore, when the sender calls the approval function for the second time, if the consumer (attacker) knows the intention, and before the miner packs the second approval transaction, a higher Gas Price is used to spend the first authorization token. When the miner packs the second transaction, a token authorization beyond the original intention will be formed.

Fix suggestion: add require((_allowed[msg.sender][spender] == 0) || (value == 0), "HxERC20: use increaseAllowance & decreaseAllowance instead"); code to limit the second call, forcibly use increaseAllowance & decreaseAllowance function instead.

```
..../**
.... * @dev Approve the passed address to spend the specified amount of tokens on behalf of msg.sender.
.... * Beware that changing an allowance with this method brings the risk that someone may use both the old
.... * and the new allowance by unfortunate transaction ordering. One possible solution to mitigate this
.... * race condition is to first reduce the spender's allowance to 0 and set the desired value afterwards:
.... * https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729
.... * @param spender The address which will spend the funds.
.... * @param value The amount of tokens to be spent.
.... *
.... * **ChainsGuard** Low risk: did not alleviate the hidden dangers of race conditions
.... */
....function approve(address spender, uint256 value) public returns (bool) {
....    require(spender != address(0));
....    // **ChainsGuard** require((_allowed[msg.sender][spender] == 0) || (value == 0), "HxERC20: use increaseAllowance & decreaseAllowance instead");
....    _allowed[msg.sender][spender] = value;
....    emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, value);
....    return true;
....}
```

3.6 Design Flaw

Unreasonable code logic processing or wrong coding will lead to abnormal contract execution, functional or security does not meet expectations, etc. Before the contract is officially deployed, the entire code needs to be checked for integrity and multi-faceted to ensure that the contract code logic is correct.

Test result: **pass**

3.7 DDoS Attack

"Unrecoverable malicious operations or controllable unlimited resource consumption" can all be called denial of service in smart contracts. An attacker may call a contract function by constructing malicious parameters, which may lead to logical processing problems that cannot be recovered by the deployed contract, and the service is denied. The smart contract usually makes the entire code logic unable to continue execution and "stop service".

Test result: **pass**

3.8 Pseudo-random Number

The values such as block.timestamp, block.number, etc. in the smart contract are predictable. When the contract involves random number generation, do not use easily accessible variables or parameters as seeds to generate random numbers. A better method is to use The external service Oraclize performs random number generation and processing.

Test result: **pass**

3.9 Front-running

Every transaction and smart contract calls requires miners to confirm the mining. During this time period, it is extremely easy for an attacker to maliciously read the transaction or call details, and then use the high Gas miner incentive mechanism to give priority to their transactions or calls. form Front-Running.

Test result: **pass**

3.10 Short Address Attack

When the virtual machine parses the smart contract bytes, it will automatically filling the number of parameter bytes. The attacker can construct malformed data to make smart contract calls. Automatic byte filling will cause unintended parameter values to change.

Test result: **pass**

3.11 Data Privacy

The smart contract code needs to encrypt and protect the stored user's private information. Anyone can obtain the relevant information stored in the contract by querying the data on the chain. If the private information is not encrypted or the encryption is not strict, it is easy to cause privacy leakage.

Test result: **pass**

3.12 Contract backdoor

In the blockchain ecosystem, some project parties themselves do not have the ability to develop smart contracts. They usually choose some smart contract automation generation tools for one-click generation and automatic deployment on the blockchain. This opens up opportunities for hackers to insert backdoor codes into smart contracts. Once the backdoor code is inserted into the smart contract, the hacker can use its backdoor to manipulate the contract arbitrarily, which will cause fatal harm to the project party.

Test result: **pass**

3.13 Code Optimization

Each step of smart contract code execution needs to spend corresponding gas. Non-standard code writing will cause unnecessary gas waste. Code l

logic optimization can help the smart contract logic to be clearer, the execution efficiency is higher, and the Gas costs less.

Test result: Needs optimization

Missing return statement: The HxOwnable#acceptOwnership() function does not return true after receiving the owner, which will cause unexpected bugs in calls that rely on this result.

```
...// **ChainsGuard** Pass
...function acceptOwnership() public onlyNewOwner returns(bool) {
...    emit OwnershipTransferred(owner, newOwner);
...    owner = newOwner;
...    newOwner = address(0);
...    // **ChainsGuard** Missing return statement: return true;
...}
```

Redundant code: Consider remove the require(account != address(0)); code in the Roles#add() and Roles#remove() functions, because they will always call the same code in the Roles#has() function. The remaining code can save a small amount of gas.

```
... /**
...  * @dev give an account access to this role
...  *
...  * **ChainsGuard** Pass
...  */
... function add(Role storage role, address account) internal {
...     require(account != address(0)); // **ChainsGuard** Redundant code: Remove to save gas
...     require(!has(role, account)); // **ChainsGuard** ensure the account is not yet a member of the role
...
...     role.bearer[account] = true;
... }

... /**
...  * @dev remove an account's access to this role
...  *
...  * **ChainsGuard** Pass: Remove account assigned role
...  */
... function remove(Role storage role, address account) internal {
...     require(account != address(0)); // **ChainsGuard** Redundant code: Remove to save gas
...     require(has(role, account)); // **ChainsGuard** ensure the account is a member of the role
...
...     role.bearer[account] = false;
... }
```

4 Security Warnings

4.1 Owner & Pauser Private-Key Protect

Owner and Pauser Roles can freeze and lock any user account, and the frozen account cannot continue to transfer tokens. Excessive authority design means greater responsibility. Owner and Pauser should protect their private keys to prevent theft of private keys from destroying the ecosystem.

4.2 Use untrusted libraries

The upgradeable implementation in this contract is not trusted. The code for the upgrade contract is derived from the <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-labs> repository. The code of this repository is experimental.

tal, and OpenZeppelin does not recommend these code is used in a production environment.

```
.... /**
....  * @dev Fallback function allowing to perform a delegatecall
....  * to the given implementation. This function will return
....  * whatever the implementation call returns
....  */
.... function () payable external {
....     address impl = implementation;
....     require(impl != address(0));
....     assembly {
....         let ptr := mload(0x40)
....         calldatacopy(ptr, 0, calldatasize)
....         let result := delegatecall(gas, impl, ptr, calldatasize, 0, 0)
....         let size := returndatasize
....         returndatacopy(ptr, 0, size)

....         switch result
....         case 0 { revert(ptr, size) }
....         default { return(ptr, size) }
....     }
.... }
```

5 Summary of Security Audit

This contract, code style is good, no exploitable security issues found. The overall estimated safety status is **warning status**.

The intelligent contract audit results only provide the actual basis for the authorizer to formulate corresponding security measures and solutions.

6 Smart Contract Code

```
1  pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2
3  library HxSafeMath { //중요 1/3: 자식에서 compile 문제로 SafeMath->HxSafeMath
4
5      /**
6       * @dev Multiplies two unsigned integers, reverts on overflow.
7
8       */
9
10     function mul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
11
12         // Gas optimization: this is cheaper than requiring 'a' not being zero, but the
13         // benefit is lost if 'b' is also tested.
14
15         // See: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/pull/522
16
17         if (a == 0) {
18             return 0;
19         }
20
21         uint256 c = a * b;
22
23         require(c / a == b);
24
25         return c;
26     }
```

```
21  /**
22  * @dev Integer division of two unsigned integers truncating the quotient, reverts on division by zero.
23  */
24  function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
25      // Solidity only automatically asserts when dividing by 0
26      require(b > 0);
27      uint256 c = a / b;
28      // assert(a == b * c + a % b); // There is no case in which this doesn't hold
29
30      return c;
31  }
32
33  /**
34  * @dev Subtracts two unsigned integers, reverts on overflow (i.e. if subtrahend is greater than minuend).
35  */
36  function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
37      require(b <= a);
38      uint256 c = a - b;
39
40      return c;
41  }
```

42

43 /**

44 * @dev Adds two unsigned integers, reverts on overflow.

45 */

46 function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {

47 uint256 c = a + b;

48 require(c >= a);

49

50 return c;

51 }

52

53 /**

54 * @dev Divides two unsigned integers and returns the remainder (unsigned integer modulo),

55 * reverts when dividing by zero.

56 */

57 function mod(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {

58 require(b != 0);

59 return a % b;

60 }

61 }

62

```
63 library Roles {  
  
64     struct Role {  
  
65         mapping (address => bool) bearer;  
  
66     }  
  
67  
68     /**  
69      * @dev give an account access to this role  
70      */  
71     function add(Role storage role, address account) internal {  
  
72         require(account != address(0));  
73         require(!has(role, account));  
  
74  
75         role.bearer[account] = true;  
  
76     }  
  
77  
78     /**  
79      * @dev remove an account's access to this role  
80      */  
81     function remove(Role storage role, address account) internal {  
  
82         require(account != address(0));  
83         require(has(role, account));
```

```
84
85     role.bearer[account] = false;
86 }
87
88 /**
89  * @dev check if an account has this role
90  * @return bool
91  */
92 function has(Role storage role, address account) internal view returns (bool) {
93     require(account != address(0));
94     return role.bearer[account];
95 }
96 }
97
98 contract HxOwnable { //중요:자식에서 compile 문제로 Ownable -> HxOwnable
99     address public owner;
100     address public newOwner;
101
102     event OwnershipTransferred(address indexed previousOwner, address indexed newOwner);
103
104     constructor() public {
```

```
105         owner = msg.sender;

106         newOwner = address(0);

107     }

108

109     modifier onlyOwner() {

110         require(msg.sender == owner);

111         _;

112     }

113     modifier onlyNewOwner() {

114         require(msg.sender != address(0));

115         require(msg.sender == newOwner);

116         _;

117     }

118

119     function isOwner(address account) public view returns (bool) {

120         if( account == owner ){

121             return true;

122         }

123         else {

124             return false;

125         }
```

```
126     }

127

128     function transferOwnership(address _newOwner) public onlyOwner {

129         require(_newOwner != address(0));

130         newOwner = _newOwner;

131     }

132

133     function acceptOwnership() public onlyNewOwner returns(bool) {

134         emit OwnershipTransferred(owner, newOwner);

135         owner = newOwner;

136         newOwner = address(0);

137     }

138 }

139

140 contract PauserRole is HxOwnable{

141     using Roles for Roles.Role;

142

143     event PauserAdded(address indexed account);

144     event PauserRemoved(address indexed account);

145

146     Roles.Role private _pausers;
```



```
147
148     constructor () internal {
149         _addPauser(msg.sender);
150     }
151
152     modifier onlyPauser() {
153         require(isPauser(msg.sender) || isOwner(msg.sender));
154         _;
155     }
156
157     function isPauser(address account) public view returns (bool) {
158         return _pausers.has(account);
159     }
160
161     function addPauser(address account) public onlyPauser {
162         _addPauser(account);
163     }
164
165     function removePauser(address account) public onlyOwner {
166         _removePauser(account);
167     }
```

```
168
169     function renouncePauser() public {
170         _removePauser(msg.sender);
171     }
172
173     function _addPauser(address account) internal {
174         _pausers.add(account);
175         emit PauserAdded(account);
176     }
177
178     function _removePauser(address account) internal {
179         _pausers.remove(account);
180         emit PauserRemoved(account);
181     }
182 }
183
184 contract Pausable is PauserRole {
185     event Paused(address account);
186     event Unpaused(address account);
187
188     bool private _paused;
```

```
189
190     constructor () internal {
191         _paused = false;
192     }
193
194     /**
195      * @return true if the contract is paused, false otherwise.
196      */
197     function paused() public view returns (bool) {
198         return _paused;
199     }
200
201     /**
202      * @dev Modifier to make a function callable only when the contract is not paused.
203      */
204     modifier whenNotPaused() {
205         require(!_paused);
206         _;
207     }
208
209     /**
```

```
210      * @dev Modifier to make a function callable only when the contract is paused.
211      */
212      modifier whenPaused() {
213          require(!_paused);
214          _;
215      }
216
217      /**
218       * @dev called by the owner to pause, triggers stopped state
219       */
220      function pause() public onlyPauser whenNotPaused {
221          _paused = true;
222          emit Paused(msg.sender);
223      }
224
225      /**
226       * @dev called by the owner to unpause, returns to normal state
227       */
228      function unpause() public onlyPauser whenPaused {
229          _paused = false;
230          emit Unpaused(msg.sender);
```

```
231     }  
  
232 }  
  
233  
234 interface IERC20 {  
  
235     function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);  
  
236  
237     function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external returns (bool);  
  
238  
239     function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);  
  
240  
241     function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);  
  
242  
243     function balanceOf(address who) external view returns (uint256);  
  
244  
245     function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256);  
  
246  
247     event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);  
  
248  
249     event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);  
  
250 }  
  
251
```

```
252 contract HxERC20 is IERC20 { //중요:자식에서 compile 문제로 ERC20 -> HxERC20

253     using HxSafeMath for uint256;

254

255     mapping (address => uint256) internal _balances;

256

257     mapping (address => mapping (address => uint256)) internal _allowed;

258

259     uint256 private _totalSupply;

260

261     /**

262     * @dev Total number of tokens in existence

263     */

264     function totalSupply() public view returns (uint256) {

265         return _totalSupply;

266     }

267

268     /**

269     * @dev Gets the balance of the specified address.

270     * @param owner The address to query the balance of.

271     * @return An uint256 representing the amount owned by the passed address.

272     */
```

```
273     function balanceOf(address owner) public view returns (uint256) {  
  
274         return _balances[owner];  
  
275     }  
  
276  
277     /**  
  
278     * @dev Function to check the amount of tokens that an owner allowed to a spender.  
  
279     * @param owner address The address which owns the funds.  
  
280     * @param spender address The address which will spend the funds.  
  
281     * @return A uint256 specifying the amount of tokens still available for the spender.  
  
282     */  
  
283     function allowance(address owner, address spender) public view returns (uint256) {  
  
284         return _allowed[owner][spender];  
  
285     }  
  
286  
287     /**  
  
288     * @dev Transfer token for a specified address  
  
289     * @param to The address to transfer to.  
  
290     * @param value The amount to be transferred.  
  
291     */  
  
292     function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public returns (bool) {  
  
293         _transfer(msg.sender, to, value);
```

```
294         return true;

295     }

296

297     /**

298     * @dev Approve the passed address to spend the specified amount of tokens on behalf of msg.sender.

299     * Beware that changing an allowance with this method brings the risk that someone may use both the old

300     * and the new allowance by unfortunate transaction ordering. One possible solution to mitigate this

301     * race condition is to first reduce the spender's allowance to 0 and set the desired value afterwards:

302     * https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729

303     * @param spender The address which will spend the funds.

304     * @param value The amount of tokens to be spent.

305     */

306     function approve(address spender, uint256 value) public returns (bool) {

307         require(spender != address(0));

308

309         _allowed[msg.sender][spender] = value;

310         emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, value);

311         return true;

312     }

313

314     /**
```



```
315      * @dev Transfer tokens from one address to another.
316
317      * Note that while this function emits an Approval event, this is not required as per the specification,
318
319      * and other compliant implementations may not emit the event.
320
321      * @param from address The address which you want to send tokens from
322
323      * @param to address The address which you want to transfer to
324
325      * @param value uint256 the amount of tokens to be transferred
326
327      */
328
329      function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public returns (bool) {
330
331          _allowed[from][msg.sender] = _allowed[from][msg.sender].sub(value);
332
333          _transfer(from, to, value);
334
335          emit Approval(from, msg.sender, _allowed[from][msg.sender]);
336
337          return true;
338      }
339
340      /**
341
342      * @dev Increase the amount of tokens that an owner allowed to a spender.
343
344      * approve should be called when allowed[_spender] == 0. To increment
345
346      * allowed value is better to use this function to avoid 2 calls (and wait until
347
348      * the first transaction is mined)
349
350      * From MonolithDAO Token.sol
351
352      * Emits an Approval event.
```

```
336      * @param spender The address which will spend the funds.
337      * @param addedValue The amount of tokens to increase the allowance by.
338      */
339      function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) public returns (bool) {
340          require(spender != address(0));
341
342          _allowed[msg.sender][spender] = _allowed[msg.sender][spender].add(addedValue);
343
344          emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, _allowed[msg.sender][spender]);
345
346          return true;
347      }
348
349      /**
350       * @dev Decrease the amount of tokens that an owner allowed to a spender.
351       * approve should be called when allowed[_spender] == 0. To decrement
352       * allowed value is better to use this function to avoid 2 calls (and wait until
353       * the first transaction is mined)
354       * From MonolithDAO Token.sol
355       * Emits an Approval event.
356       * @param spender The address which will spend the funds.
357       * @param subtractedValue The amount of tokens to decrease the allowance by.
358       */
```

```
357     function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) public returns (bool) {
358         require(spender != address(0));
359
360         _allowed[msg.sender][spender] = _allowed[msg.sender][spender].sub(subtractedValue);
361         emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, _allowed[msg.sender][spender]);
362         return true;
363     }
364
365     /**
366     * @dev Transfer token for a specified addresses
367     * @param from The address to transfer from.
368     * @param to The address to transfer to.
369     * @param value The amount to be transferred.
370     */
371     function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal {
372         require(to != address(0));
373
374         _balances[from] = _balances[from].sub(value);
375         _balances[to] = _balances[to].add(value);
376         emit Transfer(from, to, value);
377     }
```

```
378
379  /**
380   * @dev Internal function that mints an amount of the token and assigns it to
381   * an account. This encapsulates the modification of balances such that the
382   * proper events are emitted.
383   * @param account The account that will receive the created tokens.
384   * @param value The amount that will be created.
385   */
386  function _mint(address account, uint256 value) internal {
387      require(account != address(0));
388
389      _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(value);
390      _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(value);
391      emit Transfer(address(0), account, value);
392  }
393
394  /**
395   * @dev Internal function that burns an amount of the token of a given
396   * account.
397   * @param account The account whose tokens will be burnt.
398   * @param value The amount that will be burnt.
```

```
399     */

400     function _burn(address account, uint256 value) internal {

401         require(account != address(0));

402

403         _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(value);

404         _balances[account] = _balances[account].sub(value);

405         emit Transfer(account, address(0), value);

406     }

407

408     /**

409     * @dev Internal function that burns an amount of the token of a given

410     * account, deducting from the sender's allowance for said account. Uses the

411     * internal burn function.

412     * Emits an Approval event (reflecting the reduced allowance).

413     * @param account The account whose tokens will be burnt.

414     * @param value The amount that will be burnt.

415     */

416     function _burnFrom(address account, uint256 value) internal {

417         _allowed[account][msg.sender] = _allowed[account][msg.sender].sub(value);

418         _burn(account, value);

419         emit Approval(account, msg.sender, _allowed[account][msg.sender]);
```

```
420     }

421 }

422

423 contract ERC20Pausable is HxERC20, Pausable {

424     function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {

425         return super.transfer(to, value);

426     }

427

428     function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {

429         return super.transferFrom(from, to, value);

430     }

431

432     /*

433      * approve/increaseApprove/decreaseApprove can be set when Paused state

434      */

435

436     /*

437      * function approve(address spender, uint256 value) public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {

438          *     return super.approve(spender, value);

439          * }

440          *
```

```
441      * function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint addedValue) public whenNotPaused returns (bool
      success) {

442      *      return super.increaseAllowance(spender, addedValue);

443      * }

444      *

445      * function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint subtractedValue) public whenNotPaused returns
      (bool success) {

446      *      return super.decreaseAllowance(spender, subtractedValue);

447      * }

448      */

449 }

450

451 contract ERC20Detailed is IERC20 {

452     string private _name;

453     string private _symbol;

454     uint8 private _decimals;

455

456     constructor (string memory name, string memory symbol, uint8 decimals) public {

457         _name = name;

458         _symbol = symbol;

459         _decimals = decimals;
```

```
460     }

461

462     /**

463      * @return the name of the token.

464      */

465     function name() public view returns (string memory) {

466         return _name;

467     }

468

469     /**

470      * @return the symbol of the token.

471      */

472     function symbol() public view returns (string memory) {

473         return _symbol;

474     }

475

476     /**

477      * @return the number of decimals of the token.

478      */

479     function decimals() public view returns (uint8) {

480         return _decimals;
```



```
481     }

482 }

483

484 contract CBK is ERC20Detailed, ERC20Pausable {

485

486     struct LockInfo {

487         uint256 _releaseTime;

488         uint256 _amount;

489     }

490

491     address public implementation;

492

493     mapping (address => LockInfo[]) public timelockList;

494     mapping (address => bool) public frozenAccount;

495

496     event Freeze(address indexed holder);

497     event Unfreeze(address indexed holder);

498     event Lock(address indexed holder, uint256 value, uint256 releaseTime);

499     event Unlock(address indexed holder, uint256 value);

500

501     modifier notFrozen(address _holder) {
```

```
502         require(!frozenAccount[_holder]);
503     };
504 }
505
506 constructor() ERC20Detailed("Cobak Token", "CBK", 18) payable public {
507
508     _mint(msg.sender, 100000000 * (10 ** 18));
509 }
510
511 function balanceOf(address owner) public view returns (uint256) {
512
513     uint256 totalBalance = super.balanceOf(owner);
514     if( timelockList[owner].length > 0 ){
515         for(uint i=0; i<timelockList[owner].length;i++){
516             totalBalance = totalBalance.add(timelockList[owner][i]._amount);
517         }
518     }
519
520     return totalBalance;
521 }
522
```

```
523     function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public notFrozen(msg.sender) returns (bool) {  
524         if (timelockList[msg.sender].length > 0 ) {  
525             _autoUnlock(msg.sender);  
526         }  
527         return super.transfer(to, value);  
528     }  
529  
530     function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public notFrozen(from) returns (bool) {  
531         if (timelockList[from].length > 0) {  
532             _autoUnlock(from);  
533         }  
534         return super.transferFrom(from, to, value);  
535     }  
536  
537     function freezeAccount(address holder) public onlyPauser returns (bool) {  
538         require(!frozenAccount[holder]);  
539         frozenAccount[holder] = true;  
540         emit Freeze(holder);  
541         return true;  
542     }  
543
```

```
544     function unfreezeAccount(address holder) public onlyPauser returns (bool) {  
545         require(frozenAccount[holder]);  
546         frozenAccount[holder] = false;  
547         emit Unfreeze(holder);  
548         return true;  
549     }  
550  
551     function lock(address holder, uint256 value, uint256 releaseTime) public onlyPauser returns (bool) {  
552         require(_balances[holder] >= value, "There is not enough balances of holder.");  
553         _lock(holder, value, releaseTime);  
554  
555         return true;  
556     }  
557  
558     function transferWithLock(address holder, uint256 value, uint256 releaseTime) public onlyPauser returns  
        (bool) {  
559         _transfer(msg.sender, holder, value);  
560         _lock(holder, value, releaseTime);  
561         return true;  
562     }  
563
```

```
564     function unlock(address holder, uint256 idx) public onlyPauser returns (bool) {  
565         require( timelockList[holder].length > idx, "There is not lock info.");  
566         _unlock(holder,idx);  
567         return true;  
568     }  
569  
570     /**  
571     * @dev Upgrades the implementation address  
572     * @param _newImplementation address of the new implementation  
573     */  
574     function upgradeTo(address _newImplementation) public onlyOwner {  
575         require(implementation != _newImplementation);  
576         _setImplementation(_newImplementation);  
577     }  
578  
579     function _lock(address holder, uint256 value, uint256 releaseTime) internal returns(bool) {  
580         _balances[holder] = _balances[holder].sub(value);  
581         timelockList[holder].push( LockInfo(releaseTime, value) );  
582  
583         emit Lock(holder, value, releaseTime);  
584         return true;
```

```
585     }

586

587     function _unlock(address holder, uint256 idx) internal returns(bool) {

588         LockInfo storage lockinfo = timelockList[holder][idx];

589         uint256 releaseAmount = lockinfo._amount;

590

591         delete timelockList[holder][idx];

592         timelockList[holder][idx] = timelockList[holder][timelockList[holder].length.sub(1)];

593         timelockList[holder].length -=1;

594

595         emit Unlock(holder, releaseAmount);

596         _balances[holder] = _balances[holder].add(releaseAmount);

597

598         return true;

599     }

600

601     function _autoUnlock(address holder) internal returns(bool) {

602         for(uint256 idx =0; idx < timelockList[holder].length ; idx++ ) {

603             if (timelockList[holder][idx]._releaseTime <= now) {

604                 // If lockupinfo was deleted, loop restart at same position.

605                 if( _unlock(holder, idx) ) {
```

```
606             idx -= 1;

607         }

608     }

609 }

610     return true;

611 }

612

613 /**

614  * @dev Sets the address of the current implementation

615  * @param _newImp address of the new implementation

616  */

617 function _setImplementation(address _newImp) internal {

618     implementation = _newImp;

619 }

620

621 /**

622  * @dev Fallback function allowing to perform a delegatecall

623  * to the given implementation. This function will return

624  * whatever the implementation call returns

625  */

626 function () payable external {
```

```
627     address impl = implementation;

628     require(impl != address(0));

629     assembly {

630         let ptr := mload(0x40)

631         calldatacopy(ptr, 0, calldatasize)

632         let result := delegatecall(gas, impl, ptr, calldatasize, 0, 0)

633         let size := returndatasize

634         returndatacopy(ptr, 0, size)

635

636         switch result

637         case 0 { revert(ptr, size) }


638         default { return(ptr, size) }

639     }

640 }

641 }
```


7 Smart Contract UML



Appendix A. Explanation of Security Risk Status Levels

Security risk status statement	
1	good status The contract is in good running condition, and there are no or only sporadic low-risk security problems. At this time, as long as the existing security policy is maintained, the safety level requirements of the system can be met.
2	warning status There are some loopholes or security risks in the smart contract, which have not been used on a large scale. At this time, targeted reinforcement or improvement should be carried out according to the problems found in the evaluation, and then redeployment.
3	serious status Smart contract has been widely used. Serious loopholes or security problems that may seriously threaten the normal operation of the contract are found in the intelligent contract. At this time, measures should be taken immediately to redeploy the strengthened intelligent contract.
4	emergency status The tokens related to the intelligent contract have been opened for trading. Serious loopholes or security problems that may seriously threaten the normal operation of the contract have been found in the intelligent contract, which may cause serious damage to economic interests. At this point, should immediately stop the contract related token trading, immediately take measures to redeploy the strengthened intelligent contract.